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ABSTRACT 
TURKISH-GREEK RELATIONS WITHIN 
THE EUROPEAN UNION FRAMEWORK 
 
KILIÇ ÖZLEM 
M.A,  in European Studies Program, Thesis  
Supervisor: Prof. Üstün Ergüder 
February 2009  
Keywords: Greece-Turkey relations, Turco-Greek Disputes, Cyprus 
issue, Aegean disputes, European Union (EU), EU-Greece relations, 
EU-Turkey relations  
 
Turko-Greek relations have been strained by a number of conflicting issues such as Cyprus, 
Continental Shelf, Territorial Waters, the Öcalan affair, and the S-300 Missiles crisis on 
Cyprus. Until the December 1999 Helsinki Summit, Greece was one of the strong 
opponents of Turkey’s membership in the European Union (EU). However, at the Helsinki 
Summit of 1999, Greece dropped her negative position permitting Turkey to be declared by 
the EU as a candidate country. This shift in foreign policy had a direct impact on both 
Turkey-Greece and Turkey-EU relations. It also represents a major step forward on bilateral 
relations.  
The research question tries to explore how did Greek-Turkish relations, disputes in the 
Aegean and Cyprus entanglement shape Turkey-EU relations and after the Helsinki Summit 
in 1999 and also with Greek-Turkish rapprochement, how do we expect Greek-Turkish 
relations to influence Turkey-EU relations. The focus of the thesis will cover a time period 
between the Athens Treaty of 1961 and December 2005, when Turkey reached the negotiation 
phase in her EU accession.  
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ÖZET 
AVRUPA BĐRLĐĞĐ ÇERÇEVESĐNDE TÜRK-YUNAN 
ĐLĐŞKĐLERĐ 
 
KILIÇ ÖZLEM 
Yüksek Lisans, Avrupa Çalışmaları Bölümü Tezi 
Tez Danışmanı: Prof. Üstün Ergüder  
Şubat 2009 
Anahtar Kelimeler:  Yunanistan-Türkiye Đlişkileri,  Türk-Yunan 
Münakaşası, Kıbrıs Sorunu, Avrupa Birliği, Avrupa Birliği-Yunanistan 
Đlişkileri, Avrupa Birliği-Türkiye Đlişkiler  
 
Türk-Yunan ilişkilerinde Kıbrıs, kıta sahanlığı,  kara suları, Öcalan vakası ve Kıbrıs’ta ki S-
300 füze krizi gibi birçok ters düşen sorun mevcuttur. Aralık 1999 Helsinki Zirvesine kadar 
Yunanistan, Türkiye’nin Avrupa Birliği’ne girmesine en güçlü karşıt olmuştur. 1999 Helsinki 
Zirvesinde, Yunanistan olumsuz fikrini iptal etmiş ve Türkiye’nin AB’ye aday ülkeler 
arasında gösterilmesine izin vermiştir. Bu izin verme hem Türk-Yunan hem de Türkiye-
Avrupa Birliği ilişkilerini doğrudan değiştirmiştir. Bu, ikili ilişkilerde önemli bir adımı temsil 
eder. Şüphesiz ki bu olay ilişkilerde yeni ve umutlu bir başlangıç olarak değerlendirilebilir. 
Bu tez Avrupa Birliği ışığında Türk-Yunan ilişkilerini içermektedir. Araştırma konusu ikili 
ilişkilerin tarihsel gelişimini Türkiye’nin Avrupa Birliği adaylığı altında incelemektedir.  
 
Tezin odaklandığı zaman aralığı 1961 Atina Antlaşması ile Aralık 2005’te Türkiye’nin 
Avrupa Birliği ile müzakere tarihi aldığı zaman sürecini kapsamaktadır. Türk- Yunan ilişkileri 
Ege ve Kıbrıs sorunlarına da atıfta bulunularak tartışılacaktır.   
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CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION 
This thesis attempts to analyze Greek-Turkish relations within the European Union 
framework. The European Union has been an important actor in solving conflicts between 
Greece and Turkey – a member of the EU and a candidate for membership. This is why this 
thesis can provide an understanding of the role the European Union can play in resolving 
conflicts.  
 
In the thesis I will analyze the advantages and disadvantages of EU membership for Greece 
and Turkey. In other words, I will examine how Greece used the advantages of being an EU 
member country in the late 1980’s and 1990’s. The Turkish membership application for EU 
membership gave Greece a strong position against Turkey. However, after the 1999 Helsinki 
Summit opening the EU’s door to Turkey, Greece did not block Turkey’s path to full 
membership. This is an important development that needs further investigation. 
 
The thesis consists of five main chapters. The first chapter is the introductory chapter of the 
thesis.   
 
In the second chapter, the main disputes between the two neighboring countries will be 
analyzed. The primary aim of this chapter is to explain the tension in bilateral relations. Core 
issues of the Aegean conflict; such as the continental shelf, territorial waters, airspace, the FIR 
Line, demilitarization of the East Aegean Islands, status of the islets and rocks, and the 
Kardak/Imia Crisis, will be analyzed so as to understand the tension in bilateral relations. 
Then, the other important point of this chapter is to analyze the Cyprus entanglement. As it is 
known, Cyprus is one of the major problems in the relations of the two neighboring countries 
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and their relations with the EU. This section aims to demonstrate the reasons why and how 
Cyprus became an issue of dispute between the two neighboring countries.   
 
In formulating the thesis one must look at the role and impact of the EU right from the initial 
application of each country to EEC membership. The third chapter will cover the long process 
of Greece’s EU accession in order to analyze and understand the Greek motivation behind the 
decision to become a full member of the European Community (EC)1.  I will pay special 
attention to analyze the decision of Prime Minister Karamanlis to apply for membership in the 
European Economic Community (EEC) in 1959. I will also look into the Athens Treaty 1961. 
This third chapter will also dwell on Greece’s relations with the EC. Greece’s membership in 
the EC in 1981 and Turkey’s reaction to her membership will be analyzed to understand the 
impact of this membership on bilateral relations. Then, the Özal era in Turkey and Turkey’s 
application for full membership in 1987, and the reaction of Greece to this application will be 
studied. In the same year as Turkey’s application, the Aegean crisis occurred. This chapter 
will continue with the Aegean crisis in 1976 and 1987 and the Davos process. The chapter 
will try to show that Greece used her EC membership as a trump card using her veto power to 
stop Turkey’s dialogue with the EC. There is no doubt that Turkey had to confront a Greek 
barrier in her relations with the EC. Then, the reflection of this tension through the EU will be 
explained and the Luxembourg Summit and Agenda 2000 will be discussed.  
 
In the fourth chapter, a new era in bilateral relations will be examined. The earthquake 
disaster in Turkey reinforced the peace process between the two neighbors and the EU’s 
decision concerning Turkey’s status at the 1999 Helsinki Summit led to the beginning of a 
new period in Turkish-Greek relations. This part will be defined as a period of 
                                                 
1
 The EC and EU will be used interchangeably according to the time period’’  
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rapprochement. Moreover, Greece’s position and Turkey’s EU candidacy for membership 
will be discussed. The position of the Greek Government will be also considered, and a 
section will explain Turkey’s accession negotiations.  
 
In the concluding chapter, Turkey-Greece relations within the EU framework will be studied 
and finally the lesson drawn from this case will be analyzed. The impact of bilateral relations 
on the Turkey-Greece-EU triangle and how Greece has used the advantage of EU membership 
will be evaluated. In other words, the importance of the role of the EU in Turkish-Greek 
relations will receive special attention. This thesis will analyze how and why the EU shaped 
the process of rapprochement, with the purpose of providing insights about the lessons that 
can be learned from this unique case.  
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CHAPTER II: GREEK-TURKISH RELATIONS AND 
DISPUTES IN THE AEGEAN (1976-1999) 
 
The aim of this second chapter is to present in detail the main disputes between two 
neighboring countries, the Aegean and Cyprus disputes. The chapter is important to 
understand the main issues that underline the conflict between Greece and Turkey. As I will 
show in the subsequent chapters, the dispute in the Aegean has not only been the main focus 
in bilateral relations but also in Turkey’s relations with the European Union after Greece’s 
membership to the Club.  
 
2.1 Aegean Crisis in 1976 -1987 and the Davos Process 
Although the two neighboring countries had many problems, there were three main phases in 
developing closer relations.2 In the first phase, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and Eleftherios 
Venizelos signed a formal ‘Friendship and Cooperation Treaty’ in 1933.3 Then, two countries 
became members of NATO in 1952.4 ‘‘Both Greece and Turkey were able to cooperate under 
the NATO banner in putting away their disagreements’’.5 In addition, the Balkan Pact in 1953 
strengthened their friendship.6 
 
However, in 1976 and 1987 war was very close.7 The main problem was the continental shelf 
dispute between Greece and Turkey that surfaced during those years. Since 1973 Turkey 
                                                 
2
 Öniş, Ziya and Yılmaz, Şuhnaz, Greek-Turkish Rapprochement: Rhetoric or Reality, 2007, p: 1.  
3
 Larrabee, F. Stephen and Lesser, O. Ian, Turkish Foreign Policy in the Age of Uncertainty, 2003, p:73.  
4
 Evin, Ahmet, Pols 509 Greek-Turkish Relations Lecture Notes, Sabancı University, unpublished, 2008.  
5
 Aydın, Mustafa and Ifantis, Kostas, Turkish-Greek Relations The Security Dilemma in the Aegean, 2004, p:25.  
6
 Evin, Ahmet, Lecture Notes, 2008.  
7
 Rumelili Bahar, ‘‘The European Union’s Impact on the Greek-Turkish Conflict’’, Working Papers Series in EU 
Border Conflict Studies, No. 6 (January 2004), p: 3.   
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started to challenge Greek claims of sovereignty in the Aegean. According to a Greek 
observer Turkey:   
• ‘‘Granted oil exploration licenses on portions of the Greek continental Shelf 
in the Aegean   
• Sent research vessels, accompanied by warship, to carry out research on the 
Greek continental shelf  
• Proposed joint exploration of the ‘disputed’ area (that is, the Greek area).’’8 
 
The continental shelf dispute also happened because of oil.9 In 1976, Greece announced oil 
and natural gas discoveries in the area and also claimed rights on the continental shelf in the 
Aegean Sea. Turkey considered the issue a fait accompli.10 However, the negotiations 
between the two neighboring countries’ governments did not bring any solutions to the 
problem. The Greek claim for 10 nautical miles air space and the Turkish government 
rejection to it have since remained as one of the core problems between Athens and Ankara. 11   
 
In November 1976, the Bern Protocol was signed between Greece and Turkey.12 They wanted 
to hold negotiations to reach an agreement on the Aegean disputes surrounding the continental 
shelf and air space. Both Greece and Turkey agreed that “the negotiation shall be frank, 
thoroughgoing and pursued in good faith, with a view to reaching an agreement based on their 
mutual consent with regard to the delimitation of the continental shelf as between 
                                                 
8
 Chircop, Aldo, and Gerolymatos, Andre and Iatrides, John, The Aegean Sea After Cold War;Security and Law 
of the Sea Issues, 2000, p:64.  
9
 Aydın, and Ifantis, p:28.  
10
 Bölükbası, Süha, “The Turco-Greek Relations: Issues, Policies and Prospects” cited  in Dodd, Clement H., 
Turkish Foreign Policy: New Prospects, 1992, p:34.  
11
 Ibid, p:35.  
12
 After the 1976 crisis in the Aegean, Greek and Turkish representatives came together in Bern to negotiate the 
continental shelf issue. On November 2, 1976, the Bern protocol was declared. In the declaration it was stated 
that both sides kept their views on the continental shelf issue but they would refrain from unilateral actions that 
may impede the resolution of their bilateral problems. This declaration was important because it confirmed the 
rights and interests of both sides in the Aegean Sea, and stated that these rights and interests would not be 
removed by unilateral actions. See Bahar Rumelili, “The European Union’s Impact on the Greek-Turkish 
Conflict”, Working Papers Series in EU Border Conflict Studies, No.6 (January 2004), 4; Aksu, Fuat, “Ege 
Sorunlarının Geleceği ve Türkiye AB Üyelik Sürecinde Türkiye’nin Seçenekleri, Stratejik Araştırmalar Dergisi 
3, Sayı 5 (Temmuz 2005), pp:16-17.  
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themselves”.13 Moreover, the Bern Agreement urged Greece and Turkey in Article 6 “to 
refrain from initiative or act concerning the Aegean Continental Shelf that might trouble the 
negotiations”.14 However, the talks between the two countries did not finish with a final 
agreement. No progress was achieved with the agreement. In 1981, Greek Premier 
Papandreou cut relations with Turkey.15  
 
In 1987, the continental shelf dispute again became a problem between the two countries. 
Greece wanted to nationalize the North Aegean Petroleum Consortium, which received 
drilling permission in the north of the Aegean Sea but the Turkish government objected.16 
Although the tension between Greece and Turkey did not decrease, this dispute ended with 
the Davos Process in 1988.  
 
Although, the 1988 Davos Process was a ‘short lived dialogue’17, it was accepted as the 
second rapprochement in bilateral relations.18 Both Özal and Papandreou noted “the need to 
avoid the kind of confrontation that, in March 1987, had brought them to the verge of war”.19 
They made genuine efforts to understand each other’s viewpoint, which was considered an 
improvement in bilateral relations.20  
 
 
                                                 
13
 Article 1 of the Bern Agreement 1976, the full text of the Agreement can be found in Kılıç Hulusi, 2000, 
p:277. See Appendix A for the text of Bern Agreement.  
14
 Ibid, Articles 8 and 9.  
15
 Bölükbaşı, Deniz, ‘‘Turkey and Greece Disputes A Unique Case in International Law’’, 2004, 
(London:Cavendish Publishing), p:287.  
16
 Bölükbaşı, Süha, p:37.  
17
 Bahcheli Tozun, Turning a New Page in Turkey’s Relations with Greece? The Challenge of Reconciling Vital 
Interests, in Aydin Mustafa – Ifantis Costas, (eds.) New Perspectives in Greek-Turkish Relations, Frank Cass, 
2003. p:97.  
18
 Öniş-Yılmaz, p:2.  
19
 Clogg, p:20.   
20
 Birand, Mehmet Ali, ‘‘Turkey and the Davos Process: Experiences and Prospects’’ in the Greek-Turkish 
Conflict in the 1990’s Domestic and External Influences, edited by Dimitri Constas, 1991, (New York:St. 
Martin’s Press), p:27-39.  
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As Coufoudakis emphasized “Papandreou may have wished to disprove Western and Turkish 
allegations as to his intransigence and of using Greek-Turkish issues for domestic 
purposes”.21 The Davos Process was also beneficial to Turkey. The basic reason to negotiate 
with Greece was to eliminate “one of the obstacles to increased US military and economic 
assistance and to her EC membership application”.22 Although both sides wanted to resume 
bilateral relations and implement their valid reasons, the Davos Process did not offer a 
solution to the serious problems between the two countries, and the failure of this Process 
could not be prevented. Moreover, it did not last a long time.23 The politicians, officials, press 
and also public did not give due consideration to the Davos Process. The Turkish Prime 
Minister went to Greece after 35 years, however, he encountered opposition. Özal was 
protested not only by Greeks and Greek Cypriots but also by Kurds and Armenians. This can 
be shown as loss of the Davos Spirit.24 The Greek press considered Davos a ‘mistake’ and 
blamed Papandreou because according to the press, he started negotiations without a 
precondition of withdrawal of Turkish troops from Cyprus.25 Moreover, public opinion did 
not give importance to the Process in both countries.26 Therefore, this second rapprochement 
did not achieve its purpose.  
 
2.2 Problems in the Aegean Sea  
The Aegean Sea dispute is the main issue between Greece and Turkey. The unique 
geographical features of the Aegean Sea should be analyzed rigorously in order to understand 
                                                 
21
 Coufoudakis, Van, ‘‘Greek Political Party Attitudes Turkey: 1974-1989’’, in theTurkish-Greek Conflict in the 
1990’s Domestic and External Influences, ed. Dimitri Constas, 1991, (New York: T. Martin Press), p:50.  
22
 Ibid, p:50.  
23
 Öniş and Yılmaz, p:2.  
24
 Pridham, Geoffrey, ‘‘Linkage Politics Theory and the Greek-Turkish Rapprochement’’, in the Greek-Turkish 
Conflict in the 1990’s Domestic and External Influences, ed. Dimitri Constas, 1991, (New York: St. Martin’s 
Press), p:83.  
25
 Ibid, p:84.  
26
 Clogg, Richard, ‘‘Greek-Turkish Relations in the Post-1974 Period’’ in the Greek-Turkish Conflict in the 
1990’s Domestic and External Influences, edited by Dimitri Constas, 1991, (New York: St. Martin’s Press), 
p:23.  
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the reasons for the complex and continuing conflict.27 First and foremost the Aegean Sea has 
a narrow width and moreover, there are lots of islands, islets and rocks.28 It is a semi-closed 
sea bounded by Greece in the West and Turkey in the east.29 Other states do not have direct 
access to the Aegean Sea.  
 
The Laussanne Treaty was signed on 24 July 1923, defining sovereignty in the Aegean Sea.  
Article 6 of the Lausanne Treaty stated that “…islands and islets lying within 3 nautical miles 
of the coast are included within the frontier of the coastal state”.30 And in the Article 12, it 
was stated that “except where a provision to the contrary is contained in the present treaty, the 
islands situated at less than three miles from the Asiatic coast remain under Turkish 
sovereignty”.31  
 
In the 1930’s, Turkey and Greece cooperated because of Turkish peaceful foreign policy and 
order within the Greek boundaries. The two neighboring countries wanted to secure the status 
quo and improve bilateral relations. As a result, the leaders of these neighbor countries met 
and on October 30, 1930 they signed the “Treaty of Neutrality, Conciliation and 
Arbitration”.32 This Treaty was related to limitations of naval armaments, stating that the 
countries would have to inform each other six months before purchasing new warships.33 
 
                                                 
27
 For socio-economic characteristics structure of the Aegean Sea and its islands, see Acer, Yücel. ‘‘The Aegean 
Maritime Disputes and International Law’’, 2003, (Wiltshire: Ashgate), pp:5-16.  
28
 Inan, Yüksel and Acer, Yücel, ‘‘The Aegean Disputes’’ in Ali Kraosmanoğlu and Seyfi Tashan (ed.s), ‘‘The 
Europeanization of Turkey’s Security Policy: Prospects and Pitfalls’’, 2004, (Ankara:Foreign Policy Institute), 
p:1.  
29
 Aydın and Ifantis, p:27.  
30
 Bölükbaşı Deniz, p:846.  
31
 Ibid, p:845. (In view of these provisions, the Lausanne Treaty implicitly recognized the status of the 3 nautical 
miles of territorial sea prevailing at that time).  
 
32
 Evin, Ahmet, Pols 509 Lecture Notes, 2007.  
33
 Bölükbaşı Deniz, p:39.  
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However, this cooperation between Turkey and Greece did not last. After the Cyprus conflict, 
disagreements over the Aegean Sea began, and have become the main source of conflict 
between the two countries. According to Greece, there is only one issue of dispute, which is 
that of the continental shelf, and the others are clear violations of her sovereign rights in the 
Aegean Sea. However, according to Turkey, the continental shelf issue is just one of 
numerous disputes, including those of the territorial waters, airspace, the FIR Line and the 
militarization of the Eastern Aegean. 
 
2.2.1 Continental Shelf  
This issue arose when Greece announced natural gas and oil discoveries in the Aegean and 
claimed rights on the continental shelf in the Sea. Ankara assumed this issue as casus belli.34 
 
This issue arose because of the existence of oil in the Aegean.35 In 1963, Greece started to 
conduct research work, and granted exploration licenses in the Aegean Sea outside Greece’s 
territorial waters. Then in 1968, Turkey began her first seismic research activities in the 
Aegean Sea.  
 
The continental shelf is a new concept in international law. It was first defined in a declaration 
from the American President Harry Truman in September 1945.36 In the declaration, Truman 
stated that the US government “regards the natural resources of the subsoil and seabed of the 
continental shelf beneath the high seas but contiguous to the coasts of the United States as 
appertaining to the United States, subject to its jurisdiction and control”.37 New arguments in 
the international law of the sea, and new strains in the bilateral relations of coastal countries, 
                                                 
34
 Bölükbaşı, Süha, p: 34.   
35
 Aydın – Ifantis, p:28.  
36
 Pazarcı, Hüseyin, ‘‘Uluslararası Hukuk Dersleri II. Kitap’’, 1999, (Ankara:Turhan Kitabevi), p:393.  
37
 Truman Proclamation No.2667, 10 Fed. Reg. 12303 cited in International Boudary Cases: The Continental 
Shelf, 1992, (Cambridge: Grotius), p:2.  
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were opened because this declaration created clashing claims over continental shelves. The 
Geneva Convention in 1958, article 1, states that:  
 
 
‘‘For the purpose of these articles, the term "continental shelf" 
is used as referring (a) to the seabed and subsoil of the 
submarine areas adjacent to the coast but outside the area of the 
territorial sea, to a depth of 200 meters or, beyond that limit, to 
where the depth of the superjacent waters admits of the 
exploitation of the natural resources of the said areas; (b) to the 
seabed and subsoil of similar submarine areas adjacent to the 
coasts of islands’’.38 
 
This article created problems amongst coastal states depending on the development of 
technology. Moreover, the Convention stated that islands can also have a continental shelf, 
and that has become the main argument of Greece.  
 
After the Geneva Convention, the other contribution to the issue of continental shelf was 
brought by the ICJ in 1969. The North Sea Continental Shelf Cases made a decision relating 
to Netherlands, Denmark and Germany. The term ‘‘natural prolongation’’ of the coastal state 
under the sea was used as a basic principle of the continental shelf.39 This situation in turn 
influenced subsequent jurisprudence, changing the focus from water depth and exploitability 
to the geological characteristics of the seabed.40 Besides, it can be appropriate to define an 
element of proportionality which delimitates the extent of the continental shelf areas that 
appertain to that state and the length of its cost which is measured in the general direction of 
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the coast line.41 This is the basis of Turkey’s main argument about the continental shelf issue 
in the Aegean Sea. 
 
The Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea gave an exact definition of the 
continental shelf, which should be used to better understand disputes surrounding the 
definition of a shelf’s outer limits given in the Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf in 
1958.42 
 
Article 76(1) of the 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea gave a more exact definition. It 
included the following new definition of the continental shelf:   
‘‘The continental shelf of a coastal State comprises the seabed and 
subsoil of the submarine areas that extend beyond its territorial sea 
throughout the natural prolongation of its land territory to the outer 
edge of the continental margin, or to a distance of 200 nautical miles 
from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is 
measured where the outer edge of the continental margin does not 
extend up to that distance’’.43 
 
 
Greece was favorable to the 1958 Continental Shelf Convention and also the 1982 Convention 
on the Law of the Sea. However, Turkey was not a party to these Conventions. Also, Turkey 
did not ratify either of these two Conventions. However, the Law of the Sea Convention is 
accepted as customary international law. It is widely accepted in the international community, 
has a binding effect on all states, and has been approved by the ICJ.44 
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According to the Greek government, Turkey’s position does not conform to international law. 
Since islands also have continental shelves, the Greek islands are part of the mainland. A 
median line between the Greek islands and Turkey should be applied.45 If this approach were 
used, the unity of the Greek lands would be realized. However, Turkey believes Greece’s 
intention is to make the Aegean a Greek sea. For Turkey, ‘natural prolongation’ should be 
used to solve the continental shelf dispute between Turkey and Greece. Open sea rules cannot 
be applied in the Aegean because the Sea is different from other seas in the world. The 
Aegean should be considered an area of ‘special circumstances’ because of its exceptional 
geographical characteristics.  
 
Greece and Turkey want to solve the dispute differently. Greece accepts not only the 1958 
Continental Shelf Convention, but also the 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea. The 
provisions of the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention are accepted as customary international law, 
with a binding effect, but Turkey does not recognize this convention as pertaining to the Aegean 
dispute, and Ankara did not ratify these treaties. However, Turkish government believes that the 
all conflicts in the Aegean Sea should be solved together so as to have a permanent peace.46  
 
Therefore, it is clear that the two parties have incompatible positions. Greece maintains the 
Aegean conflict should be resolved judicially, but Turkey wants to settle it in bilateral 
negotiations. Ankara does not want to appeal to the ICJ unless bilateral contacts are successful.  
Turkey wants to solve all the conflicts over the Aegean Sea so as to create a lasting peace.  
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2.2.2 Territorial Waters 
The waters surrounding the state’s land and sovereign territories are considered its territorial 
waters. In the Lausanne Peace Treaty, Article 6 states that:  
 ‘‘In so far as concerns frontiers defined by a waterway as distinct 
from its banks, the phrases "course" or "channel" used in the 
descriptions of the present Treaty signify, as regards non-navigable 
rivers, the median line of the waterway or of its principal branch, and, 
as regards navigable rivers, the median line of the principal channel of 
navigation. It will rest with the Boundary Commission to specify 
whether the frontier line shall follow any changes of the course or 
channel which may take place, or whether it shall be definitely fixed 
by the position of the course or channel at the time when the present 
Treaty comes into force.  
In the absence of provisions to the contrary, in the present Treaty, 
islands and islets Iying within three miles of the coast are included 
within the frontier of the coastal State’’.47  
With the Peace Treaty, the extension of Greece’s and Turkey’s territorial waters to three 
nautical miles (n.m.) was accepted.  However, this was changed by the Greek government as 
early as 1936. Greece extended her territorial waters to 6 nautical miles, including the 
Aegean. Turkey did not accept this. In 1964, Turkey also increased her territorial waters to 6 
n.m. in the Aegean Sea. With Turkey’s declaration, the Turkish possession of the Aegean 
increased to 7.47%, while Greek held 43.68% of the Aegean.48 (Table 1)  
Subsequently, tension escalated after the Cyprus Military Intervention in the 1970’s. The two 
neighboring countries have taken the territorial waters issue at hand as a national security 
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issue.49 However, the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of Sea, Article 3, states that “Every 
state has the right to establish the breadth of the territorial sea up to a limit not exceeding 12 
nautical miles, measured from the baselines determined in accordance with this 
Convention’’.50 The Greek Parliament ratified this Convention with the Act of 31 May 
1995.51 Article 2 states that “Greece has an inalienable right to extend its territorial sea up to 
12 nautical miles at any time”.52 This statement has directly increased the tension. With 12 
n.m Greece holds nearly 72% of the waters in the Aegean Sea, where Turkey holds only 
8.7%. (Table 2) With 12 n.m Greece would leave very little area to Turkey. This change also 
affects the amount of high sea, leaving only 20% in the whole Aegean. In this case, “all ships 
sailing westwards from Turkish Aegean ports to the Mediterranean would be obliged to pass 
through Greek waters”.53 Greece ignores not only the decrease in the Turkish territorial 
waters, but also in the high seas. There is no doubt that the Turkey’s reply to the Greek 
demand was to declare a casus belli. For Turkey, Greece increasing its territorial waters to 12 
nautical miles would be reason for war against Greece.  
 
Greece has always been in favor of 12 miles of territorial waters, but Turkey has not signed 
the convention, because Turkey does not accept the Greek position. As a result, Greece 
believes Turkey violates international law because it prevents Greece from exercising her 
international rights. 
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Table 1: The Sharing of Territorial Waters. The Aegean Sea would be divided as shown, 
based on territorial boundaries of 6 or 12 nautical miles.   
 
2.2.3 Airspace and the FIR Line   
In 1944 the Chicago Convention on Civil Aviation was held. In this Convention international 
air space above the high seas and also public international law were codified.54 According to 
the Convention, the airspace of a state is the airspace above her territory and territorial waters, 
and a country has full sovereignty within it. A state’s territorial airspace has the same outer 
limit as its territorial waters.55  
 
As determined in the Lausanne Peace Treaty, territorial waters and airspace are the same, at 3 
nautical miles. For Ankara and Athens both, the territorial limits in the Aegean are 6 miles.56 
However, Greece violates this rule, the sole violation in the world.57 ‘‘Law No. 4141 of 26 
March 1913 defined the width of the Greek territorial sea at 10 nautical miles’’.58 Greece’s 
claim goes against international norms and principles.59  
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Territorial Sea 
 
Breadths, High        
 
Seas in the 
 
Aegean Sea % 
 
Breadth 
 
Turkish (%) 
 
Greek (%) 
 
 
International 
 
6 miles 
 
7.47 
(14.000 sq km) 
 
43.68 
(81.969 sq km) 
 
48.85 
(89.469 sq km) 
 
       12 miles  
 
8.76 
(16.438 sq km) 
 
71.53 
(34.224 sq km) 
 
 
19.71 
(36.985 sq km) 
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The Greek claim for airspace is 10 nautical and Turkey disagrees with this. Along with other 
Aegean disputes and the Cyprus entanglement, the airspace issue has become a heated, core 
problem in bilateral relations.60  
 
Moreover, so as to keep Greece’s position from becoming the custom in international law, 
“Turkish military crafts systematically and periodically have been entering the 4 mile zone 
which is not accepted as Greek airspace”.61 So, the territorial airspace issue is another 
unsolved Aegean Sea problem.  
 
The other issue related to airspace is the Flight Information Region (FIR) line. The FIR was 
established so as to get necessary information to civilian aircraft. There is more international 
aircraft movements now, and the planes have different service requirement. As a result, 
providing facilities and services in national airspace was not enough, and they had to provide 
them for international movements too. The Chicago Convention rules could not meet the 
need, so the ICAO made FIRs to meet the new requirements.62   
 
In 1952, the Aegean beyond Turkish airspace was put under Greek responsibility according to 
the ICAO.63 However, after the Cyprus incident, tension came when Greece insisted on 
monitoring Turkey’s movements over the Aegean Sea. To protect her security, Turkey 
requested, with Notice to Aircraft 714 (NOTAM), to be notified of any attack against her 
from the Aegean in August 1974. With this notice, Turkey unilaterally extended her area of 
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responsibility up to the middle of the Aegean through Athens FIR, asking for information in 
advance before the aircraft pass to the East of the new line.64 
 
At the same time, Greece declared the air corridor between the neighboring countries unsafe 
for international civil aviation. In 1980, flights were resumed and the two countries withdrew 
their Notams.65 However, the withdrawal of the NOTAMs does not deal with the underlying 
problem. Greece stated that “in accordance with ICAO rules and international practice, all 
civil and military aircraft should submit their flight plans prior to their entry into the Athens 
FIR for reasons of safety for civilian flights”.66   
 
However, this requirement contradicts Article 3 of the Chicago Convention. It states that:  
‘‘Civil and state aircraft 
a) This Convention shall be applicable only to civil aircraft, and shall not 
be applicable to state aircraft.  
b) Aircraft used in military, customs and police services shall be deemed 
to be state aircraft.  
c) No state aircraft of a contradicting state shall fly over the territory of 
another state or land thereon without authorization by special agreement or 
otherwise, and in accordance with the terms thereof.  
d) The contracting States undertake, when issuing regulations for their 
state aircraft, that they will have due regard for the safety of navigation of 
civil aircraft’’.67  
 
Greece’s demand should not be applied because of Article 3 (b). Turkey wants modification 
of the FIR responsibilities based upon equality and national security, but Greece rejects this 
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request and demands Turkey’s aircraft file flight plans with Greece.68 The issue is still under 
discussion between the two neighboring countries.   
 
2.2.4 Demilitarization of the East Aegean Islands   
The militarized nature of the East Aegean islands is the one of the hottest issues in bilateral 
relations. According to the Lausanne Treaty, the Greek islands closest to the Turkish coasts 
should be demilitarized by Athens in order to maintain peace.   
  
In the Lausanne Peace Treaty, Article 13 states that:   
‘‘With a view to ensuring the maintenance of peace, the Greek Government 
undertakes to observe the following restrictions in the islands of Mytilene, Chios, 
Samos and Nikaria: 
(1) No naval base and no fortification will be established in the said 
islands. 
(2) Greek military aircraft will be forbidden to fly over the territory of 
the Anatolian coast. Reciprocally, the Turkish Government will 
forbid their military aircraft to fly over the said islands. 
(3) The Greek military forces in the said islands will be limited to the 
normal contingent called up for military service, which can be 
trained on the spot, as well as to a force of gendarmerie and police in 
proportion to the force of the gendarmerie and police existing in the 
whole of the Greek territory’’.69 
 
With this article, demilitarization of the four islands, Mytilene, Chios, Samos and Nikaria, 
was codified.   
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In the Straits Convention of 1923, Article 4 provided for the demilitarization of Samothrace 
and Lemnos. In Article 4, sub-paragraph 2 refers to the demilitarization of the islands in the 
Aegean. It states that: 
‘‘The zones and islands indicated below shall be demilitarized: 
1) Both shores of the Straits of the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus (Strait of Istanbul) 
over the extent of the zones delimited. 
2) All the islands in the Sea of Marmara, with the exception of the island of Emir Ali 
Adası. 
3) In the Aegean Sea, the islands of Samothrace, Lemnos, Imbros, Tenedos and Rabbit 
Islands’’.70  
 
After the Second World War, the Dodecanese Islands were also demilitarized with the Paris 
Treaty of 1947. Article 14 of the Paris Treaty states that:  
‘‘1) Italy hereby cedes to Greece in full sovereignty the Dodecanese Islands 
indicated hereinafter, namely Stamphalia (Astropalia), Rhodes (Rhodes), 
Calki (Kharki), Scarpanto, Casos (Casso), Piscopis (Tilos), Misiros (Nisiros), 
Calemnos (Kalymnos), Leros, Patmos, Lipsos (Lipso), Simi (Symi), Cos 
(Cos) and Castellorizzo, as well as the adjacent islets. 
 2) These islands shall be and shall remain demilitarized.  
 3) The procedure and the technical conditions governing the transfer of these 
islands to Greece will be determined by agreement between the Governments 
of the United Kingdom and Greece and arrangements shall be made for the 
withdrawal of foreign troops not later than 90 days from the coming into force 
of the present Treaty’’.71 
 
In the article sub-paragraph 2 refers to the demilitarization of the Dodecanese islands, saying 
the islands should remain free of military forces.  
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The militarization of these islands began after the Cyprus intervention in the 1970s. After the 
Cyprus tension, Greek foreign and defense policies were shaped against the perceived 
Turkish threat, and Greece tried to justify it, and it is not an illegal breach of the arguments. 
The arguments fall under three main groups: 
‘‘(i) Arguments and claims of a specific nature 
• 1936 Montreux Convention 1923 Lausanne Strait Convention relation; 
abrogation by the former of demilitarization obligations imposed on Lemnos 
and Samothrace islands.  
(ii) Assertions relying on misinterpretation and distortion of certain actions and 
statements from Turkey  
• Statement by Turkish Foreign Minister, T. R. Aras in the Parliament on 31July 
1936.  
• Letter of Turkish Ambassador in Athens on 6 May 1936.  
• Remilitarization by Turkey of the islands Gökçeada (Imbros) and Bozcada 
(Tenedos) 
(iii) Legal argument of general nature 
• Preventive right of self-defense 
• Jus cogens 
• Rebus sic stantibus 
• Res inter alios acta’’.72  
 
According to Athens, Turkey cannot intervene on the Dodecanese militarization because she 
is not a signatory to the Paris Treaty. According to Greece, the militarization of the islands 
was a response to the 1975 foundation of the Turkish Aegean Army outside of NATO 
command. Turkey founded this army in case of attack from the Aegean Sea and in reaction to 
America’s arms embargo after the Cyprus military intervention. Greece used the Turkish 
action to her advantage, arguing that it presented a threat. According to Athens, its 
militarization of the Dodecanese was in its legitimate defense, but this explanation was 
unacceptable to Turkey, and it is still a controversial issue.73 
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2.2.5 Status of the Islets, Rocks, and the Kardak/Imia Crisis   
In 1996, Turkey and Greece found themselves in a military confrontation. The reason was 
about a conflict about the sovereignty of a pair of rock islets, called Kardak/Imia. The islets 
were 3.8 n.m. away from Turkish coasts.74 When Turkish coasters ran around over the islets 
‘‘nobody could see that simple incident would start a series of events that brought two allies 
to the edge of war’’.75  
 
Kardak/Imia crisis was not the first short crisis of short and high tension that brought the two 
neighboring countries almost war. However, a new dimension was created within the frame of 
Aegean Sea disputes. Both Greece and Turkey were discussed over the sovereignty of an 
uninhabited islet. Therefore, this situation makes many islets and rocks in the Aegean very 
important. After this crisis, Turkey introduced ‘grey zones’ stated that there were islets and 
rocks in the Aegean Sea, whose belongings were not specified in the treaties. However, 
Greece did not agree to this view by stating that the signed treaties were clear enough to 
declare the sovereignty rights in the Aegean Sea.76  
 
EU Commission’s attitude was clear about the Kardak crisis. The first step was taken on the 
way of pulling Turkish-Greek disputes within the EU.77 In the declaration of the Commission 
after Kardak Crisis, it was stated that the southern borders of the EU were Greek borders and 
the Union was in solidarity with Greece. It was reminded within the Customs Union that high 
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level relations were aimed with Turkey. Also, the relations should be based on democracy, 
international law and peace.78  
 
The third party intervention was effective on the Greek policy towards Turkey. Mesut Yılmaz 
who was the prime minister stated that ‘‘Turkey would not rule out third-party solutions in the 
Aegean if all the interrelated issues were treated as a package’’.79 Although it was a step taken 
towards the Greek solutions, there were no improvements on the other disagreements besides 
the continental shelf. Also it was clear that the Commission’s declaration pointed out the new 
Greek policy towards Turkey was effective.  
 
The decision of the Commission was shared by the Council. A similar emphasis took place in 
the General Affairs Council Declaration of 15 July 1996. In the declaration, it was specified 
that Turkey-EU ‘‘relations should be based on a clear commitment to the principles and 
respect of international law and agreements, and that disputes created by territorial claims 
should be referred to the International Court of Justice’’.80 Since the declaration, Aegean 
disputes started to take place in the official documents of the EU under the title of ‘Turkey’ 
emphasizing the need for more efforts for the settlement of the Aegean dispute.  
 
2.2 Cyprus Entanglement   
Since 1878, Cyprus had been under British government. There have been two different 
communities on the island. One of them was Turkish Cyprus, made up of Muslims and the 
other was Greek Cyprus, made of Christian Orthodox. Britain also recognized the two 
communities. Greek Cypriots started campaigns and demonstrations for Enosis, uniting the 
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island with Greece, on the island after the new Archbishop Leontios was elected.81 Greece 
also wanted to unite the island as a part of the Megali Idea.82 According to the Megali Idea, 
the Greek state should embrace all Greeks regardless of the country of residence. During the 
18th and 19th centuries, the non-Muslim populations within the Ottoman Empire began to 
revolt against the Empire under the influence of rising nationalism. The Greek Megali Idea 
emerged as a part of this trend and the main argument behind the idea was to re-conquer the 
Byzantine territories and to create a Greek nation state accordingly.83 Uniting the Cyprus with 
mainland Greece was also an important part of Megali Idea.  
 
In 1954, Greece applied to the United Nations (UN). She wanted the right to self-
determination to be given to the people of Cyprus. However, the UN General Assembly did 
not discuss the situation.84 The Zurich Agreement and the London Agreement were signed 
after the bilateral relations so as to create the independent state of Cyprus. With Britain, 
Greece and Turkey were guarantor powers of the state of affairs on the island.85  
 
‘‘Under the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee, Turkey became one of the three guarantor power 
(along with Greece and Britain) of the island’s independence.’’86 ‘‘Greece, Turkey and the 
United Kingdom, taking note of the understanding of the Republic of Cyprus set out in the 
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Article I of the present Treaty, recognize and guarantee the independence, territorial integrity 
and security of the Republic of Cyprus, and also the state of affairs established by the Basic 
Articles of its Constitution. Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom likewise undertake to 
prohibit, so far as concerns them, and activity aimed at promoting, directly or indirectly, 
either union of Cyprus with any other State or partition of the island’’.87 Thus, it can be said 
that the Cyprus issue was solved peacefully with the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus.  
However, for Greek Cypriots this unification meant a step towards enosis. Then, the harmony 
which has tried to maintain with the London and Zurich Agreements tried to maintain began 
to be destroyed. Then, Turkish Cypriots were expelled from all government organs by 
pressure.  
 
Archbishop Makarios was elected as the leader of the Greek Cypriot community. However, he 
was strongly opposed to the London and Zurich Agreements. He thought that these treaties 
gave more rights to the Turkish Cypriots, especially considering their population percentage.88 
Therefore, he believed that the constitution was unfair and unworkable.  
In November 1963, the famous 13 amendments to the constitution were introduced by 
Archbishop Makarios.89 With those amendments, the bi-communal spirit of the Zurich and 
London Agreements would be abolished and an integrated, unitary state. This was considered 
the first step to the separation of Cyprus Republic. The process tried to create minority status 
rather than equal partners for Turkish Cypriots.90  
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On the island, there was huge inequity against Turkish Cypriots. Their human rights were 
violated. There is no doubt that this situation was not acceptable for both Turkey and Turkish 
Cypriots. Besides this inequity, on July 15, 1974 there was a coup against Makarios because 
he had been following more independent policies, supporting the Soviet Union and diverging 
from the enosis policy. Makarios was overthrown by the military regime of Greece. Then, he 
was replaced by a pro-enosis government. It can be said that this situation was the last, but not 
the least, step leading to Turkish intervention on the island.91 
 
In 1974, Turkey intervened to stop what amounted to a civil war and the forceful eviction of 
Cypriot Turks form their homes and violence directed to individuals. Turkish Cypriots human 
rights were violated and 30.000 Turkish Cypriots became homeless.92 
 
On July 20, 1974 Turkish military intervention began.93 Bülent Ecevit was the prime minister 
of the Turkish Republic, and he ordered the Cyprus invasion.94 With the 1960 Treaty of 
Guarantee, Turkey legitimized her invasion because the Treaty gave the right to intervene 
unilaterally to reestablish the constitutional arrangements.95 According to Article IV of the 
Treaty of Guarantee, “each of the guarantor powers reserved the right to the take unilateral 
action, if necessary, but only with the sole aim of re-establishing the state of affairs created by 
the… Treaty”.96 Furthermore, Turkey also kept “the right of individual self defense under 
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U.N. Charter Article 51,” since the coup on the island posed a danger to Turkey, “bringing 
Greek military power to a judicially independent island forty miles away”.97  
After military intervention, the island was divided into two, North and South. On 13 February 
1975, Turkish Cypriots declared the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus in the north part of the 
island as a first step. The second step was the approving unanimously the declaration of the 
Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, the TRNC, which came on 15 November 1983.98 
However, Turkey is the sole country recognizing the TRNC. Although the TRNC is both 
economically and politically dependent upon Ankara, it can be considered worth the political 
and economical costs.99 The TRNC is a security issue, her place is important for Turkey 
strategically. Turkey, with her 30.000 troops and military equipments, is capable of invading 
the area owned by the Greek Cypriots. Thus, Cyprus is crucial with reference to the strategic 
balance between Turkey and Greece.100 ‘‘For years Ecevit argued that Cyprus should be seen 
not as a burden but as an important component of Turkey’s own security’’.101 
The Turkish military intervention was a turning point for Cyprus, Turkey and also Greece. 
However, it is very obvious that the Turkish intervention and establishment of the Turkish 
Federal State of Cyprus had not only a very negative impact on Turkey-Greece bilateral 
relations, but also that it complicated relations with third parties, especially with the European 
Community.102  
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CHAPTER III: RELATIONS WITH THE EUROPEAN 
COMMUNITY: GREECE INSIDE the EC, TURKEY OUT 1981-1990 
 
This chapter will analyze the first decade of Greek membership in the Community as a full 
member with a special emphasis on Turkish-Greek relations within the EC. Firstly, reasons 
behind the Greek application for membership and Turkey’s place among these reasons will be 
discussed. Greece’s application for membership forms a milestone not only in Greek history 
but also in the history of Turkish-Greek relations and Turkish-EU relations. Then, the Ankara 
Agreement and Turkish full membership application in the Özal era will be discussed. This 
would be helpful to have a better understanding of reasons behind Turkish application for EC 
membership and Greek reactions to it. Then, the two other important developments of 
Turkish-Greek relations in the 1980’s, the Aegean dispute in 1987 and the Davos Process will 
be discussed. Lastly, in this chapter Agenda 2000 and Luxembourg Summit in 1997 will be 
explained.  
 
3.1 Karamanlis’ Decision to Apply to the EEC  
Constantine Karamanlis’ foreign policy had a strong European emphasis. According to him, 
Greece belonged to the West.103 Just after becoming prime minister in 1974, his speech in the 
parliament expressed his foreign policy aims: he announced for the first time his intention to 
secure full membership in the European Economic Community104. Karamanlis viewed Greece 
as a bridge, in his words ‘‘linking the Common Market to the Mediterranean’’105. 
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“Karamanlis saw membership as marking the end of a long period of political isolation, which 
would strengthen Greek independence and its bargaining power in relations with third parties, 
while allowing Greece to actively participate in the political development of Europe”106.  
 
There is no doubt that he definitely supported EEC membership because he wanted Greece to 
benefit from EEC membership. According to Karamanlis’ view, EEC membership would be a 
great advantage for Greece. It would contribute to both Greece’s democracy and her 
economic development. Moreover, there are other valuable reasons for application to the 
EEC. One of them has been Greece’s external and internal position. ‘‘For Greece, the 
possibility of Community membership was seen as a way of strengthening its Western 
political orientation whilst distancing itself from the US’’107. Greece wanted to cool relations 
with the USA because she did not stop the Turkish intervention in Cyprus. Greece wanted to 
solve her problems without any US influence. Moreover, another important factor was the 
perceived Turkish threat. Greece would achieve a stronger position against Turkey. EEC 
membership would give her big advantage in bilateral disputes.  Last but not least, 
Karamanlis desired, as a European country, to have "presence" in, and an impact on, the 
process towards European integration and the European model. 108   
  
In 1959 Greece applied to become an associate member in the Community. Not long after the 
application, the treaty granting association membership was signed in Athens on July 10, 
1961.  
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3.2 Signing of the Athens Treaty 1961  
On July 15, 1959, Greece applied for the Association Agreement, negotiations started on 
March 21,  1960, and the Treaty of Association was signed on July 9, 1961. It became 
operational in November 1962.   
 
Article 72 shows that Greek membership to the community was possible without a timetable. 
Article 72 states that:  
 
‘‘As soon as the operation of this Agreement has advanced far enough to 
justify envisaging full acceptance by Greece of the obligation arising out 
of the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community, the 
Contracting Parties shall examine the possibility of the accession of 
Greece to the Community’’.109 
 
 
As Hatzivassiliou states, “when they signed the Association Agreement in 1961, the Greeks 
regarded it as nothing less than a stepping stone for eventual full membership”110. In other 
words, there is no doubt that the Association Agreement in 1961 was a very important step 
for Greece despite the economic backwardness of the country.    
 
The Agreement was supposed to provide future full membership for Greece. It was intended 
to make Greece a member of the customs union, and foresaw the harmonization of economic 
policies. With those goals, the long term objective of the Agreement was defined in its first 
article as:  
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‘‘to promote a continuous and balanced strengthening of the 
commercial and economic relations between the contracting parties 
with full consideration of the need to ensure the accelerated 
development of the economy of Greece as well as the elevation of the 
level of employment and of the living standards of the Greek 
people’’.111 
 
One of the main questions about Greece-EEC relations is why Greece chose to sign an 
Association Agreement rather than applying directly for membership. This situation can be 
explained by the economic development of Greece. The disparity between Greece’s level of 
economic development and that of the EEC countries of that time made accession impractical 
for the immediate future112. ‘‘The Greek Agreement highlighted the extent to which far-
reaching domestic structural reforms were necessary to develop the Greek economy’’113.  
 
3.3 Turkey’s Associate Membership in the EEC and the Ankara Agreement   
After the Treaty of London, Turkey became a member of the Council of Europe in 1949. 
Turkey made her associate membership application in the same year as Greece.114  Both 
Turkey and Greece were among the first countries to sign the Association Agreement with 
the European Economic Community. 115 Following the acceptance of Turkey's application by 
the Council116, the Ankara Agreement, on which the present Turkey - EU relations are based, 
was signed on 12 September 1963. About Turkish membership Article 28 states;  
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 ‘‘As soon as the operation of this Agreement has advanced far enough to 
justify envisaging full acceptance by Turkey of the obligations arising out of 
the Treaty establishing the Community, the contracting Parties shall 
examine the possibility of the Accession of Turkey to the Community’’117   
 
As Commission President Walter Halstein said, ‘‘Turkey is a part of Europe’’, and the Ankara 
Agreement is evidence of Turkey’s eligibility for membership. The relationship between the 
European Union and Turkey is based on the Ankara Agreement. It is clear that without 
Associate Membership, it would be easier for the Community to say ‘no’ to Turkey as she 
rejected Morocco in 1990. 118  
 
The Ankara Agreement, under which formation of a Customs Union between the then EEC 
and Turkey would come in gradual stages, lasted 22 years. This Agreement was originally 
intended to prepare Turkey for full membership through forming closer economic and 
political cooperation. It failed to achieve that goal. This was largely due to Turkey’s failure to 
converge her economic and political system with that of the EU.119   
 
3.4 Greece Accession to the EC in 1981  
Turkey-Greece relations and Greek membership in the community are interrelated. There is 
no doubt that Turkish-Greek disputes were affected by relations between Greece and the 
Community. Greece made her full membership application on June 12, 1975120. On 28 
January 1976 in the Commission report, a pre-accession stage was seen as more suitable for 
the Greek position due to three reasons. First of all, the Greek economy was weak especially 
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when compared with the member countries of the EC. Greece’s annual GDP per capita 
growth of 5.5 percent was in sharp contrast to the 29 percent of the EC121. Secondly, an 
assumed negative impact of Greece's membership to the deepening of European integration 
was another reason. Turkish-Greek disputes were also used as an important reasons  by the 
EC122. The Community had placed itself at an equal distance from Greece and Turkey. The 
fact that Greece had started the accession negotiations with the EC while she had a dispute 
with another associate member, Turkey, did not escape attention. The Commision called 
attention to this issue. “To avoid this situation, the Commission suggested that the 
Community should play an active role in helping Greece and Turkey resolve their differences 
in parallel with the preparatory work for Greek accession”123 
 
Unanimously, the Commission’s Opinion was rejected by the Council at the meeting on 
February 9, 1976. The Greek application for full membership was accepted. Three major 
causes could be mentioned to explain why Greece’s application was favorably received. First, 
Greece promised that her full membership would not damage Turkey’s relations with the 
EC124. It was thought that “full accession negotiations would help to reintegrate Greece into 
the Western security alliance at a time of tension in the Eastern Mediterranean”125.  The EC’s 
position in the Mediterranean was another factor because the Community wanted to have an 
active role in the consolidation of Greek democracy and of democracy in the region. 
Portuguese and Spanish membership and the positive impact of the EC on the consolidation 
of these democracies helped shape the positive approach of the EC Council.126 In conclusion, 
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Greece’s membership agreement was signed in May 1979 in Athens, and became effective on 
January 10, 1981.127 Greece became an EC member after vigorous leadership by Karamanlis.  
 
3.4.1 Turkey’s attitude towards Greek Membership  
It is obvious that Greece gained a big advantage both politically and economically after full 
membership. Turkey’s dissatisfaction with this situation reflected on her relations with 
Brussels. Within those conditions there are arguments that the 1976 Aegean crisis had hidden 
agendas behind the Greek application. According to Harris C. Georgiades:  
‘‘It has been maintained that the purpose of the expedition of the 
Turkish navy survey ship Sismik 1 in the Aegean Sea in July 1976 was 
to provoke a crisis in Greek-Turkish relations and make visible to the 
Community the dangers involved in accepting Greece as a member 
state”. 128 
 
On the other hand, there were also positive results of Greece’s full membership. Greece 
guaranteed that the Community ignored Turkey-Greek disputes. According to Greece’s 
assurance, the Community also tried to put Turkey at ease by assuring that “Greece’s 
accession would not affect the development of EC-Turkey relations”.129 However, the 
developments and events after Greek membership did not support either the Greek assurance 
to the Community or the Community’s assurance to Turkey. It is clear that after Greece’s full 
membership in the EEC, relations between the Community and Turkey took on political 
dimensions.130 
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3.5 Özal Era in Turkey and Turkey’s Application for Full Membership, 1987  
In 1975, when Greece applied for full membership, Turkey did not. This is still a matter of 
debate in Turkey. Ambassador Tevfik Saraçoğlu who is one of the prominent ambassadors 
served in Brussels as a permanent representative between 1972 and 1977.131 He strongly 
believed that Turkey should be a member of the EC. He thought that if Turkey had applied for 
the EC membership at the same time as Greece, the Community would have had to accept 
Turkey or reject Greece’s application132. “Domestic political instability and civilian unrest 
(…) under weak coalition governments” were the main factors that kept Turkey away from 
submitting an application immediately after Greece133. Until 1987, it can be said that none of 
the governments in Turkey could think of taking such a big step while there was political 
instability in Turkey134. The main causes of the delay in Turkey’s EC membership were 
related to Turkish domestic politics. However, it is clear that Turkey missed a big opportunity 
in the late 1970’s and early 1980’s, when Greece became a full member, by staying outside 
the Mediterranean Enlargement.135  
 
Both Turkey and Greece got the Marshall Aid and became NATO members in 1952.136 
Moreover, Turkey was also included in the Organization of European Economic Cooperation 
(OEEC, later OECD), the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE, later 
OSCE) and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD).137 Although 
Turkey is a member of these European institutions, she is outside the European Community. 
 
                                                 
131
 Tüm Gazeteler http://www.tumgazeteler.com/?a=2346502 accessed January 2009.  
132
 Birand, Mehmet Ali, Türkiye’nin Avrupa Macerası 1959-1999, 2000, (Đstanbul: Doğan Kitapçılık), p:318.   
133
 Öniş, Ziya, “Greek-Turkish Relations and the European Union: A Critical Perspective”, Mediterranean 
Politics 6, Autumn 2001, No.3, p:35.   
134
 Evin, Ahmet, Pols 509 Greek-Turkish Relations Lecture Notes, Sabanci University, unpublished, 2007.  
135
 Müftüler-Baç, and Yannis, p:119.  
136
 Koliopoulous, John and Veremis,Thanos, Greece, The Modern Sequel: From 1821 to the Present, 2004 
(London: Hurst), p: 303.  
137
 Turkey in Europe, Report of the Independent Commission on Turkey, September 2004.  
 46 
After the military coup d'état on 12 September 1980, the then EC decided to suspend the 
Ankara agreement and freeze its political relations with Turkey on January 1982.138 It was 
only after the election of a civilian government and the shift of economic policies from an 
autarchic import-substitution model to an open market driven by market forces139, Turkey's 
relations with the EU started to normalize since maintaining relations was mutually 
beneficiary for  political, economic and specifically security reasons, given the circumstances 
during the Cold War, for both of the parties.140 In the light of the positive developments in 
relations, at 1986 Association Council meeting Turkey showed  her intention to apply for full 
membership.  
 
The Özal Era era started in Turkey after the 1983 elections. The Motherland Party, ANAP, 
won the elections of 1983 and had a majority in the parliament.141 There is no doubt that after 
this election, with the Motherland Party and Özal, a new period began in Turkey. The policies 
of Özal were the main reasons for this change. Özal also saw Turkey as a European country. 
He believed that Turks were European Muslims, so the ties between Europe and Turkey were 
based on secularism and not religion. He saw this kind of relation as more solid than one 
based on religious ties.142   
 
 ‘‘I have the honour to inform that Turkey officially requests 
membership of the European Economic Community, in accordance 
with the disposition of Article 237 of the Treaty instituting the 
European Economic Community’’143 
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Following Turkey's application, the Foreign Ministers of the Council decided to refer the 
application to the Commission for an opinion.144 The Commission stated that opening 
accession negotiations with Turkey were not possible on many grounds. ‘‘Turkey was not 
even welcomed into the waiting room, but rather was kept standing at the door’’.145 First of all 
the EC was busy with the integration of three new members, Greece Portugal and Spain, and 
was getting ready for the Maastricht Treaty. Therefore it was in no position to handle a new 
member. Moreover, the Commission also referred to the disputes between Greece and Turkey 
as well as the Cyprus problem as obstacles.146 Additionally, according to the Commission, 
there was a major gap between Turkey's economic and political development and that of 
EC,147 however, it added that the Community should pursue her cooperation with Turkey148. 
Moreover, in economic terms, the community emphasized four kinds of difficulties to be 
overcome: structural disparities in agriculture and industry, macro-economic imbalances, high 
levels of industrial protectionism, and low levels of social protection.149   
 
Although, Greece was shown to be “the only and main obstacle to the accession of Turkey 
into the Community”, it cannot be said that other members were open to Turkish full 
membership. Moreover, they did not oppose Greece’s attitude towards Turkey.150 Turkey 
given her large population which is also largely made up of Muslims, location, economy, 
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security and military potential are different from other candidates.151 On the other hand, the 
factors that effect Turkey not only emanate from Turkey itself but also derive from the 
European Union. However, so as to not break off relations, and to show Greece’s force over 
Turkey, the Community preferred to show Greece as the “sole culprit” of the problematic 
relations.152 
 
On 5 February 1990 the Council approved the Commission's recommendation and asked for 
detailed proposals on ways to strengthen EC-Turkey relations. Even though the Commission 
adopted, on June 7 1990, the “Matutes Package” to intensify financial cooperation and 
strengthen political and cultural ties, it was not approved by the Council.153  
 
Here, particular attention should be given to the 1975 Greek application for full membership 
which came was just after the 1974 Cyprus crisis. When Greece became a member of the EEC 
in 1981, she found fertile ground to Europeanize Greek Turkish disputes. So, both Greece and 
Cyprus have gained advantages over Turkey. Greece's strategy was to link any kind of 
improvement in EC-Turkey relations and Turkey's accession to the EC, to the settlement of 
disputes between Greece and Turkey. In this political context, the other issue emphasized was 
Turkey’s problems with Greece and the Cyprus issue. The Commission reported:  
 
‘‘Examination of the political aspects of the accession of Turkey would be 
incomplete if it did not consider the negative effects of the dispute between 
Turkey and one Member State of the Community, and also the situation in 
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Cyprus, on which the European Council has just expressed its concern once 
again’’.154 
 
According to the Commission Report Turkey should solve the Cyprus and Aegean issues in 
order to become a full member.155 It is clear that this action directly affected bilateral 
relations. Unfortunately, this report showed that Turkey’s EU membership was a weak 
possibility. Consequently, the bilateral Greek-Turkish conflicts have widened in scope and 
become an issue in EU-Turkey relations.156 As mentioned above, the Commission's opinion 
on Turkey's application reflected Greece's individual national interests inter alia. Thereby the 
settlement of Cyprus and of the Aegean Sea issues have gained importance, as far as the 
question of Turkey's membership is concerned.   
 
3.6 Reaction of Greece towards the Turkish Application and Turkish-Greek Relations 
after Greek Membership in the EC  
It is obvious that the most negative responses to Turkey’s application came from Greece. 
Greece responded negatively to Turkey’s application, “citing the poor record of Turkey on the 
issue of human rights, as well as the Turkish aggressive policy against Greece and the lack of 
progress on the issue of Cyprus”.157  Greece wanted to break off Turkey-EU relations and 
block Turkey’s application. It can be said that Turkey’s primary desire for full membership 
would not come true mostly because of the Greek reaction. For Turkey, this negative position 
was not surprising.  
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Turkey applied to the Community later than Greece’s full membership. This delay gave 
Greece a stronger position than Turkey. Turkey should solve bilateral relations in the way 
Greece wanted. Greece used her veto power on the Community’s decision having the effect 
that “the entry visa of Ankara was in the hands of Greece, and getting it was dependent on 
solution of the Cyprus issue”.158 It is very obvious that ‘the solution’ means the withdrawal of 
Turkey’s military forces from Cyprus and reunification of the island under a federation which 
accepted existence of two communities, but not implying separate zones. On April 1988, the 
Association Agreement was signed by Greece just after the Davos Process. It should be added that 
the Greek ‘concession’ came ‘‘after receiving concessions by Turkey on the issue of the Greek 
properties in Turkey’’.159 The Turkish concession was a result of the Davos atmosphere reflecting 
Turkey’s goodwill for increasing bilateral relations. Greek acceptance of the Association 
Agreement was an example of the policy where the EC membership card aimed to be used against 
Turkey concerning bilateral relations. There will be another example of it in the 1990s which 
would have complicated results for Turkey. By taking Cyprus into the Union picture as a member 
country brings more difficulties on the way to Community 
 
3. 7 Agenda 2000 and the Luxembourg Summit, December 1997  
Agenda 2000 was arranged by the European Commission as a recommendation to the Council 
to deal for the new membership demands from the ten Central and Eastern European applicant 
countries. In the Luxembourg Summit of December 1997 EC did decide to open accession 
negotiations with six of them. In the Agenda, Turkey had been shown neither as a candidate 
nor as a member and this situation annoyed Turkey.160   
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Lack of democracy and human rights, no permanent solution for the problems in Southeastern 
part of Turkey, unsolved Cyprus issue, and hot Greek dispute were emphasized for exclusion 
of Turkey from Agenda 2000.161 According to this Agenda 2000, there should be accordance 
between Greece and Turkey especially on border conflicts. The authority of the International 
Court of Justice should be accepted and acted with the decision of the court acted upon. 
Turkey has to settle all her disputes with Greece.162 
 
‘‘Enlargement should not mean importing border conflicts. The 
prospect of accession acts as a powerful incentive for the states 
concerned to settle any border disputes…Today several disputes, 
of low intensity, among applicants remain to be resolved…The 
Commission considers that, before accession, applicants should 
make every effort to resolve any outstanding border dispute among 
themselves or involving third countries. Failing this, they should 
agree that the dispute be referred to the International Court of 
Justice. In any event, all candidate countries should therefore, 
before accession negotiations are completed, commit themselves to 
submit unconditionally to compulsory jurisdiction, including 
advance ruling of the International Court of Justice in any present 
or future disputes.’’163  
 
The ‘exclusion’ of Ankara from the new enlargement process was not a big disappointment. 
Before the preparation of Agenda 2000, the Ankara’s demand to get candidacy status was 
expressed openly but there was an unfavorable regard towards Turkey’s membership. 
Especially, after German general elections the Christian Democrats Party did not want to 
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jeopardize their success by approving Turkey’s status. The German Prime Minister Helmut 
Kohl expressed this to the Prime Minister in Turkey who is Mesut Yılmaz.164 
 
The Luxembourg Summit on 12 and 13 December 1997 has been considered as a negative 
hallmark in Turkey-EU relationship. The new enlargement process was scheduled to start on 
March 1998 for the ten Central and Eastern countries including Cyprus. However, Turkey 
stayed out of the process.  Instead of including Turkey in the group of ten, the Council stated 
‘A European Strategy for Turkey’. Not only the Summit but also this statement was a huge 
disappointment for Ankara. The Summit led to a ‘massive deadlock’ in the EU-Turkey 
relations.165  
 
Cyprus was listed as a candidate country whereas Turkey not. According to Turkey, the 
Cyprus inclusion was an obvious sign that Union supported Athens on the Cyprus dispute and 
acting under her influence.166 However, the Council also made a statement on the relations 
between Greece and Cyprus. It was said that:  
(…) that strengthening Turkey’s links with the European Union also depends on 
(…) the establishment of satisfactory and stable relations between Greece and 
Turkey; settlement of disputes, in particular by legal process, including the 
International Court of Justice; and support for negotiations under the aegis of the 
UN on a political settlement in Cyprus on the basis of the relevant UN Security 
Council Resolutions’’.167
 
 
This is an important statement because the Aegean and Cyprus conflicts were mentioned 
clearly in the Presidency Council Conclusion. It also emphasized that their resolution should 
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be done for future relations. In the official declaration, it is obvious that it was a part hereafter 
in those issues and would even be the main respondent in the following years.  
 
Staying out from the enlargement meant that ‘‘the doors of EU would be closed to Turkey for 
at least more than 20 years’’.168 On December 14, Ankara stated that relations with the EU 
would run within the context of ‘Association Partnership’, which did not implicate the 
political staffs declared in the 1997 December Summit conclusion, and the improvement of 
relations based on the behavior of the EU in the next years.169 While it was specified that the 
integration process with the TRNC, that was development of economic integration and 
formation of a common defense doctrine, would be advanced as a response to the beginning 
of Greek Cypriot accession negotiations in name of the whole island.170 The opposition of 
Ankara may have been impressive in softening of the discourses of the Union in next summits 
about the increasing European strategy to prepare Turkey for EU membership.  
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CHAPTER IV: EARTHQUAKE DIPLOMACY: A NEW 
PARADIGM? 
After Athens became a member of the EC in 1981, a new period began in Turkish-Greek 
relations. In the 1980s Greece used the advantages of being a member of the Community to 
prevent Turkish relations with the Community. However, in the 1990s, the policy of Athens 
changed. The core aim of this chapter is to analyze Greek policies towards Turkey and the 
Rapprochement period. While there had not been a big shift in Greece’s policy towards 
Turkey during the first half of the 1990s, important changes had occurred in the second half of 
decade. Greece did not veto Turkish candidacy to the EU. The reasons behind this shift in 
Greek policy will be discussed.  
 
4.1 1999 Helsinki Summit   
There are different phases for a country to become an EU member state, and they can be 
classified into the application, candidacy, accession negotiations and finally membership. 
Depending on the phase, the obligations of the aspirant country increase along with the factors 
involved. During accession negotiations the country's ability to fulfill its obligations, while 
not the only determinant, is of utmost importance. The other determinants, influential due to 
the very nature of the enlargement process, are the national states' individual and collective 
interests, which can be defined as the impact of the candidate on EU institutions. Furthermore, 
given the decision of the individual member states to put a country’s membership to 
referendum, public opinion influences the process, since governments have to take it into 
consideration if they want to be chosen for a second term.171 
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At the Luxembourg Summit, Turkey was not included in the list of candidates.  However, two 
years later, at the 10-11 December 1999 Helsinki Summit, Turkey was officially recognized 
as a candidate.172 Considering that Turkey did not do much for candidacy over those two 
years, the reasons for this turnabout lie in EU- related dynamics. The first is the reduction in 
Greek opposition, due to obligatory budgetary cuts required to join euro zone, which 
necessitated a decrease in defense spending and thus better relations with Turkey.   
 
In late 1990s, Greece realized that it would be very difficult to solve bilateral relations if 
Ankara was isolated from the EU.173 Greece’s bargaining power vis a vis Turkey depends on 
Ankara’s aspiration to become an EU member. Greece’s power would be lost if Ankara 
stayed out from the Union like after the 1997 Luxemburg Summit.174 The second reason is the 
change in the German government from the Christian Democratic Union (CDU), which 
opposed Turkey's membership on the grounds of cultural differences, to the Social 
Democratic Party of Germany (SPD) which supports Turkey's membership and wants to 
improve relations with Turkey. Third was the decision at Luxembourg to differentiate the 
candidates based on their ability to fulfill their obligations (evaluate every candidate with its 
own merits)175 rather than grouping them together and treating them as such.176  
 
After the earth tremor, ‘‘Greece partially lifted her veto on EU aid to Turkey’’, which was a 
part of the Customs Union and vetoed by Greece because of the Aegean disputes, without 
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asking concessions.177 The grant of the Turkish candidacy status was one of the most 
important decisions of Helsinki Summit. It was stated that ‘‘Turkey is a candidate state 
destined to join the Union on the basis of the same criteria as applied to the other candidate 
States’’.178 In this decision not only Greek attitude but also other European countries’ decision 
also German decision should be mentioned. Before, there was a Greek belief which came over 
that ‘‘it would not be in position to settle its bilateral disputes with Turkey over Cyprus and 
the Aegean Sea if Turkey was left isolated and outside the orbit of the European Union’’.179  
Bargaining power of Greece was directly related to Turkey’s will to be incorporated in the 
Union. Athens favored solutions could be reached through the Union mediation. With the 
release of the Greek veto, change in the political power in Berlin and Washington’s pressure 
on the EU to keep Turkey close had an important effect on the decision taken.180           
 
One other important aspect of the 1999 Helsinki Presidency Conclusion was the removal of 
the precondition for settlement of the disputes surrounding the Republic of Cyprus's 
membership.181 It is particularly important to note that both the removal of the precondition 
and Turkey's candidacy were stated in the same presidency conclusion which implies a 
tradeoff between Greece and EU.  This example clearly illustrates how member states can use 
the EU as a tool to achieve their foreign policy objectives. In this case Greece was able to 
blackmail the EU, using its veto power to Europeanize the Turkish-Greek conflict. The 
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removal of the condition on Republic of Cyprus inevitably led to accession of Cyprus in 2004 
which further complicated relations between Turkey and EU.182  
 
Furthermore, after the Luxembourg disappointment, the opinion suppurted the view that 
‘‘Europe is an ethnic-religious club that will never accept a country of 65 million Muslims 
raised in Turkey’’.183 The beliefs that Turkey should turn its face to Asia and develop 
relations with Eastern countries and also Turkic republics.  
 
In terms of Turkish-Greek relations, there were important points that were to affect the future 
relations regarding Aegean Disputes and the Cyprus issue. In the document it stated that:  
 
‘‘…like the other candidate States, Turkey will benefit from the pre 
accession strategy to stimulate and support its reforms. This will 
include enhanced political dialogue, with emphasis on progressing 
towards fulfilling the political criteria for accession with particular 
reference to the issue of human rights, as well as on the issues referred 
to in paragraphs 4 and 9(a).’’184       
 
The forth paragraph emphases was on the peaceful settlement of outstanding disputes in 
accordance with the UN Charter. It means that candidate states should do every effort for 
resolutions. However, if the process fails, the EU promotes the settlement through the 
International Court of Justice at the latest by the end of 2004.185 In the paragraph 9(a), 
Cyprus dispute was mentioned. It was stated that the negotiations began under the auspices 
of the UN for a settlement of the Cyprus issue were supported by the EU.  
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It is obvious that two paragraphs were crucial importance for Ankara not only for the full 
membership to the Union but also bilateral relations with Athens. So, the Aegean and Cyprus 
issues, namely border disputes, started to take place in the Union’s documents related to 
Turkey’s progress. The 1999 Helsinki Summit was the last step of transforming Ankara-
Athens disputes into Turkey-Union disputes. Since then, Greece was the respondent of 
Turkey in the negotiations of settlement of disputes. However, the European Union was the 
main respondent with sanction power holding the policy.  
 
4.2 The Position of Greece and Bilateral Relations   
On September 1999 at the 54th UN General Assembly the Greek Foreign Minister George 
Papandreou enthusiastically emphasized the improvement in Greek-Turkish bilateral 
relations. However, he also did not ignore their divergent positions on both Aegean Sea and 
Cyprus. He stated that:  
‘‘If the road to peace is indeed made up of ‘a collection of 
moments’ then I also dare hope for our relations with Turkey. 
My Turkish counterpart, Ismael Cem, and I have been engaged 
in careful diplomacy for many months. We recently 
inaugurated discussion committees to address a number of 
bilateral concerns, including trade, tourism and the 
environment, where we feel our two countries have much to 
gain from mutual Cupertino. Peoples’ aspirations for the 
principles of democracy, security and prosperity can overcome 
historical strife. In this democratic spirit, we believe that our 
security is bound by the stability in the region; that our 
neighbors’ strength is our own strength’’.186  
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A ‘new’ foreign policy towards Ankara began when George Papandreou replaced Theodoros 
Pangalos as the Foreign Minister of Greece. He became minister just after a major turning 
point in bilateral relations, the ‘Abdullah Öcalan Case’.   
 
This crisis came in 1999 because of Greece’s protection of the Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) 
leader Abdullah Öcalan. Öcalan was handed over to Turkish intelligence. His presence at the 
Greek Embassy was considered direct interference by Greece in Turkish internal politics.187  
 
This event hurt Greece’s reputation in the international arena, especially in the EU, because it 
was supporting terrorist activities taken against both her neighboring country and a NATO 
ally.188 After the 1980s the policy of Greece was ‘the enemy of my enemy is my friend’, and 
Greece supported the PKK militarily, politically and economically.189 Athens’ involvement in 
the Öcalan affair had embarrassed the Greek government, and Greece wanted to improve 
bilateral relations in order to repair her image. The Foreign Minister Teodoros Pangolos 
resigned from the Greek Cabinet,190 and George Papandreou, who was elected after Pangolos, 
positioned himself as a conciliator between Athens and Ankara.191 The departure of Pangolos 
and his replacement by Papandreou opened the way for more interaction between the two 
countries.192     
 
 
After the Öcalan crisis, the principles of moderate policies and close relations guided relations 
between the two countries. This supports the idea that dialogue between the two neighboring 
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countries began before the earthquake. It paved the way for ‘Seismic Diplomacy’ in bilateral 
relations,193 coming after the EU’s decision on Ankara, but before the earthquake disaster in 
the Marmara Region. After the September 1999 earthquake in Greece, followed by Turkey’s 
assistance to the Greek people, the rapprochement became stronger.194 
 
The dual earthquakes in Greece and Turkey moved dialogue to a civil level, opening a new 
route through which the two countries could develop their relationship.195 Ziya Onis states 
that:  
‘‘The recent Greek-Turkish rapprochement has an important 
romantic or idealistic dimension, marking the start of a new 
relationship based on mutual trust and co-operation, originating from 
civil initiatives in both countries and signaling the path through 
which co-operation could be built in the future’’.196 
 
NATO’s intervention in the Kosovo Crisis was another good opportunity for Greece to 
cooperate197 and improve her image in the Western eyes.198 In the wake of the Kosovo Crisis, 
the Turkish Foreign Minister and the Greek Foreign Minister agreed to make efforts to 
improve bilateral relations.199 
 
Since 1999, sixteen agreements have been signed between Greece and Turkey.  The two 
countries have attempted to reinforce rapprochement with progress on lower-profile political 
issues like economics, environment, terrorism, illegal immigration, etc.200  
                                                 
193
 Akiman, Nazmi, ‘‘Turkish-Greek Relations: From Uneasy Coexistence to Better Relations?’’, Mediterranean 
Quarterly, 2002, Vol.13, No.3, pp:22-32.   
194
 Evin, Pols 509 Lecture Notes, 2007.  
195
 Evin, 2004, pp:4-15.  
196
 Öniş, 2001, p:38.  
197Ibid, p:8.  
198
 Heraclides, Alexis, ‘‘Greek-Turkish Relations from Discord to Detente: A Preliminary Evaluation’’, The 
Review of International Affairs, 2002, Vol. 1, No.3, p:21.  
199
 Ibid, p:22.  
200
 Bilgiç, Tolga and Karatzas, Petros, The Contraction in Greece-Turkey-EU Triangle: Rapprochements at the 
Edges, March 2004, p: 5, http://www.econturk.org/Turkisheconomy/turkeygreece.pdf  accessed January 2009. 
 61 
 
Since 1999, this practice of building better relations with lower-profile activities has extended 
to non-governmental organizations and business contact.201 Since 1999, economic relations 
have grown stronger between Athens and Ankara. Joint business councils, trade fairs, and 
business meetings between the two countries have increased since the second half of 1999. 
These activities have provided support for political rapprochement.202 
 
In addition to these developments in lower-profile politics, there has also been cooperation on 
higher-level politics at the governmental level. Since 2002, diplomats from Greece and 
Turkey have come together to negotiate the countries’ major disputes, and a group of experts 
was formed to exchange ideas on the issues.203         
 
 
Consequently, there have been major steps in bilateral relations since the end of 1990s,204 and 
conflicts of misunderstanding are less likely to happen. Continued tension is desired neither by the 
governments nor by the civilians of the two neighboring countries.205 
 
4.3 Economic Relations after Rapprochement  
This section analyses if there has been an affirmative transformation in Greek-Turkish 
economic relations after Rapprochment. In the analysis, I will utilize trade as an indicator 
because it forms the major economic activity between any two countries. Trade is the most 
straightforward form of inter-country economic relations. Trade is the first activity to respond 
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to the recent political developments especially between the two neighboring countries.206 For 
the trade relations, I will examine data on Turkey’s export to Greece and import to Greece.  
 
4.3.1 Trade Relations  
Although being neighboring countries, trade relations and cooperation between Athens and 
Turkey is a new event. The reason is the political facts in the history.207 Stronger bilateral 
relations between Ankara and Athens are more likely to have a positive effect on economical 
relations. 
  
Trade relations between Greece and Turkey before and after 1999 is analyzed to whether 
there has been a transformation in the two neighboring countries’ relations.  Table 2 indicates 
total exports of Turkey and also the exports to Greece. The table covers data a decade from 
1998 to 2008. 
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YEAR 
 
 
Total Export 
 
 
Exports to Greece 
 
% of Exports to 
Greece within the total 
exports 
1998 26 973 952  370 039  
1,371 
1999 26 587 225 406 794  
1,530 
2000 27 774 906 437 725  
1,576 
2001 31 334 216 476 095  
1,519 
2002 36 059 089 590 382  
1,637 
2003 47 252 936 920 401  
1,947 
2004 63 167 153 1 171 203  
1,854 
2005 73 476 408  1 126 678  
1,533 
2006 85 534 676  1 602 590  
1,873 
2007 107 271 750 2 262 655  
2,110 
2008 132 002 612 2 430 549  
1,841 
Table 2: Total Exports of Turkey (000 dollars)208   
  
Table 2 shows that both the total export of Turkey and exports from Turkey to Athens have 
increased 1998. Although there was an improvement in the exports to Greece, its share has 
not steadily increased.  Before 1999 period, shares of the exports to Greece never fall down.  
 
In 2006, imports from Greece were $ 1, 040 m. It was the 0.8 % of Turkish total import bill. 
Although being neighbor country, Greece was in 32nd position in ranking of countries to 
Turkey. Bulgaria is the other neighbor country of Turkey. Ankara’s imports to Bulgaria were 
%60 greater in value than Greece in 2006. On 4 May 2006, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip 
Erdoğan and Karamanlis agreed to more than double bilateral trade from the current $2 bn to 
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5$ bn.209 Therefore, it can be said that with the political interaction between Athens and 
Ankara, economic relations have improved.  
 
4.4 Opening of Accession Negotiations with Turkey in October 2005  
In 2001, Turkey adopted 34 amendments to its Constitution in order to meet the Copenhagen 
political criteria for EU membership. These amendments included abolition of the death 
penalty and authorize greater use of languages other than Turkish in public life.210  
Furthermore in 2002, an EU Adaptation Law of 15 Articles was passed in order to meet 
obligations concerning human rights.211 These efforts were intended to lead to positive 
decisions by the European Council at its 2002 Copenhagen Summit.212 However, despite 
expectations, at the Copenhagen Summit Turkey's demand to set a time table for accession 
negotiations was rejected, and instead it was agreed to meet in December 2004 to review 
Turkey’s candidacy.213  At the December 2004 Brussels Summit, the European Council 
following the Commissions report and recommendation, decided that Turkey sufficiently 
fulfilled the Copenhagen political Criteria to open accession negotiations.214 One other 
important aspect of the 2004 Brussels Presidency Conclusions is that the initiation of the 
accession negotiations would require the signing of the Protocol on the adaptation of the 
Ankara Agreement.215  
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The decision to begin accession negotiations with Turkey may be historic but the timing was  
unfortunate, due to the low level of economic growth in the large eurozone countries, a high 
level of unemployment, internal disagreements ranging from the Iraq war to the EU budget, 
and the uncertainity caused by the French and Dutch veto of the Constitutional Treaty. At the 
same time, the EU is struggling to overcome the consequences of the 2004 enlargement, its 
largest ever.216 
 
The Commission presented the Accession Negotiations Framework for Turkey to the Council 
of Foreign Ministers. However, the discussion of the framework was postponed to the 
unofficial meeting of the General Affairs and External Relations Council since Turkey had 
not signed the Additional Protocol which would extend the Customs Union to the ten new 
members including Cyprus. Subsequently, Turkey signed the agreement but at the same time 
declared that the usage of the concept of "Republic of Cyprus"did not imply recognition of  
the Greek Part of Cyprus since this extension of the Customs Union might mean implicit 
recognition (which was declaratory in design). The EU responded to this claiming that Turkey 
must recognize Cyprus and must give access to its ports and airports to Cypriot ships and 
planes, for accession negotiations to be concluded. Following that, the Council approved a 
framework for negotiations with Turkey thus enabling the negotiations to begin.217 Since 2004 
the Republic of Cyprus, not recognized by Turkey, has been one of the EU members218 with  
veto power over Turkey's membership and has thus gained leverage over Turkey on the 
Cyprus issue. Thus though the Accession Negotiations have been initiated, in December 2006 
the Council decided that negotiations will not be opened on eight chapters relevant to 
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Turkey's restrictions on the Republic of Cyprus and that no chapter will be provisionally 
closed until the Commission confirms that Turkey has fully implemented the Additional 
Protocol to the Association Agreement.219  
 
After 1999, the rapprochement period shows that there are close relations between the two 
neighboring countries both on bilateral relations and within the EU framework. The fact that 
Athens withdrew its veto against Turkish membership in the EU, bilateral negotiations 
especially between Đsmail Cem and Georgios Papandreou have improved , and increasing 
number of agreements on trade, terrorism and economic have been signed are important 
indicators of the rapprochement. However, still the Cyprus and Aegean conflicts have been 
left unsolved. Although there have been major improvements in the détente period, Athens 
and Ankara are still in conflict.    
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CHAPTER V: CONCLUSION 
This thesis aimed to analyze Turkish-Greek relations within the European Union framework. 
It was particularly shaped around the question of how Greece’s EU membership was used in 
its bilateral relations with Turkey since the former became a full member of the Community, 
and until and after candidacy status was given to Turkey in Helsinki, in 1999.  
  
In the Cold War period, the main Greek foreign and defense policy was to secure itself against 
attack from communist neighbors. Consequently, it chose to become a member of the NATO 
alliance with the neighboring country, Turkey. NATO membership can be considered a 
turning point, which brought Greece into the European alliance. After NATO membership, 
Greece applied to the EC with the same security problems. However, at that time the EC did 
not have an entity to provide military security, for economic and political reasons. Turkey was 
not one of the reasons for Greece’s application for membership, since at that time, Turkey and 
Greece were ‘compulsory friends’ because of the common Communist threat. 
 
Unfortunately, good relations did not continue very long. Greece managed to increase its 
security with NATO membership, good relations with the EC, and also with American 
assistance. However, Greece had some problems in bilateral relations, which directly affected 
the formation of its foreign and defense policies.  
 
In addition to the economic and political reasons that came under the umbrella of Karamanlis’ 
slogan ‘we belong to West’, the Turkish threat also played an important role in the EC 
membership application. Although it was foreseen that Turkish relations could affect the 
Greek membership, Greece became a full member in January 1981. Greek EC membership 
introduced a new dynamic to bilateral relations with Turkey. Greece strengthened her position 
 68 
in the EC, and used it as a big advantage against Turkey, which had been trying to get into the 
EC.  
 
In the 1980s and early 1990s, Greece used her veto tool against EC membership to force 
Ankara to accept her demands on disputes. During these years, the EC did not involve itself in 
the Cyprus and Aegean disputes. The Greek veto power became the main obstacle to 
improvement of relations between Turkey and the EC. Greece regularly used its full 
membership advantages to increase her bargaining power over Turkey.  
 
In the early 1990s, the approach of the EU on Cyprus and the Aegean disputes started to 
change. In 1995, the beginning of accession negotiations with Cyprus was guaranteed, in 
response to lifting the Greek veto on Customs Union with Turkey. Thus, the main step 
towards European involvement with the Cyprus entanglement was taken. At that point, the 
Commission was close to Greece, and supported her arguments and solutions for the Aegean 
disputes.  The EU is now closely concerned with Turkey, and the prerequisite to resolve both 
the Cyprus and Aegean disputes before Turkey can become a member has started to take its 
place in the official documents. The power of these kinds of individual considerations is well 
reflected in the European Council's presidency conclusions and the Commission's 
recommendations. Additionally, the Negotiation Framework for Turkey, prepared by the 
Commission and approved by the Council, clearly reflects the individual member states’ 
concerns as well as the collective ones. Therefore, it can be argued that the Commission's 
role, as a supranational body in design, is strictly limited by the preferences of the member 
states.   
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Greece needed to cut its military expenditures so as to enter the euro zone. In Athens, 
curtailing the military expenditure was an urgent need which was set by the Community. And 
the curtailment was depending on relations with Turkey since Ankara had been perceived as 
the main threat against Greece. Besides this economic goal of Athens, the attitude of the 
Union on the Cyprus Crisis and the Aegean disputes began to shift. In 1995, in order to 
guarantee Cyprus’ EU membership, Turkey’s Customs Union membership was also accepted 
by Greece. Moreover, after the Kardak/Imia crisis, the Commission took the attitude of 
supporting Greece’s argument and solutions for the Aegean disputes. After then, both Cyprus 
and Aegean disputes have started to take place in the official documents of the Union. Finally, 
the last step bringing the direct involvement of the EU into Turkey-Greece disputes was taken 
in Helsinki Summit. The EU accepted Turkey as a candidate, but with an important warning 
that full membership was dependent on finding a solution in Cyprus and in the Aegean. 
Having successfully transformed these disputes into an issue to be resolved according to 
criteria set by the EU, Greece now is one of the strongest supporters of Turkey’s membership 
in the Union.  
 
In the rapprochement era, there have been major improvements in bilateral relations. 
Although Greece and Turkey now cooperate in areas of tourism, trade, and terrorism, Cyprus 
and Aegean are still big problems, especially for Turkey on its way to Europe.  
 
Eventually, Greece was more successful in Europeanization of its disputes with Turkey before 
1990s. Taking the disputes within the framework of Union, Athens made the Community the 
main and official respondent of Ankara. This diplomacy brought Athens the bargaining power 
which it would not have had alone without EU support, given its relative economic and 
military power vis-à-vis Turkey. The diplomacy not only relieved Athens in terms of conflicts 
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with Ankara but also erased the label of ‘spoiled child of Europe’ and brought it close to core 
states of the Union.  
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APPENDIX A 
BERN AGREEMENT BETWEEN TURKEY AND GREECE 
(11 November 1976) 
1. The two parties agree that negotiations shall be frank, throughgoing and pursued in good 
faith, with a view to reaching an agreement based on their mutual consent with regard to the 
delimitation of the continental shelf as between themselves. 
2. The two parties agree that these negotiations shall by their very nature be strictly 
confidential. 
3. The two parties reserve their respective positions with regard to the delimitation of the 
continental shelf. 
4. The two parties undertake not in any circumstances to make use of the provisions of this 
document, or such proposals as may be made by either side during these negotiations, outside 
the context of the negotiations themselves. 
5. The two parties agree that there shall be no statements or leaks to the press on the contents 
of the negotiations, unless they decide otherwise by common accord. 
6. The two parties undertake to refrain from any initiative or act concerning the Aegean 
Continental Shelf that might trouble the negotiations. 
7. The two parties each undertake, so far as their bilateral relations are concerned to refrain 
from any initiative or act likely to throw discredit on the other. 
8. The two parties have agreed to study the practice of States and the international rules on the 
subject, with a view to eliciting such principles and practical criteria as might be of use in the 
case of the delimitation of the continental shelf between the two countries. 
9. To that end, a mixed commission will be set up to be composed of national representatives. 
10. The two parties agree to adopt a gradual rhythm in the negotiating process to be followed, 
after mutual consultation. 
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Done in Berne, in two copies, in the French language, 11 November 1976 
 
Jean TZOUNIS,                                                                             Ali Suat BðLGE, 
Head of the Hellenic delegation                                           Head of the Turkish delegation 
 
 
Source: Kılıç, Hulusi. Bilateral Agreements, Essential Documents and Declarations 
between Turkey and Greece since the Proclamation of the Turkish Republic Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey, (Ankara: Deputy Directorate General for 
Maritime and Aviation Affairs, 2000)  
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APPENDIX B 
13 PROPOSALS  
 
1. The right of veto of the President and the Vice-President of the Republic to be abolished. 
2. The Vice-President of the Republic to deputise for or replace the President of the Republic 
in case of his temporary absence or incapacity to perform his duties. In consequence, 
therefore, all the constitutional provisions in respect of joint action by the President and the 
Vice-President of the Republic to be modified accordingly. 
3. The Greek President of the House of Representatives and its Turkish Vice-President to be 
elected by the House as a whole and not as at present the President by the Greek Members of 
the House and the Vice-President by the Turkish Members of the House. 
4. The Vice-President of the House of Representatives to deputise for or replace the President 
of the House in case of his temporary absence or incapacity to perform his duties. 
5. The constitutional provisions regarding separate majority for enactment of Laws by the 
House of Representatives to be abolished. 
6. The constitutional provision regarding the establishment of separate Municipalities in the 
five main towns to be abolished. Provision should be made so that: (a) The Municipal Council 
in each of the aforesaid five towns shall consist of Greek and Turkish Councillors in 
proportion to the number of the Greek and Turkish inhabitants of such town by whom they 
shall be elected respectively. (b) In the Budget of each of such aforesaid towns, after 
deducting any expenditure required for common services, a percentage of the balance 
proportionate to the number of the Turkish inhabitants of such town shall be earmarked and 
disposed of in accordance with the wishes of the Turkish Councillors.  
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7. The constitutional provision regarding Courts consisting of Greek Judges to try Greeks and 
of Turkish Judges to try Turks and of mixed Courts consisting of Greek and Turkish Judges to 
try cases where the litigants are Greeks and Turks to be abolished. 
8. The division of the Security Forces into Police and Gendarmerie to be abolished, (Provision 
to be made in case the Head of the Police is a Greek the Deputy Head to be a Turk and vice 
versa). 
9. The numerical strength of the Security Forces and of the Army to be determined by Law 
and not by agreement between the President and the Vice-President of the Republic. 
10. The proportion of the participation of Greek and Turkish Cypriots in the composition of 
the Public Service and of the Forces of the Republic, i.e. the Police and the Army, to be 
modified inproportion to the ratio of the population of Greek and Turkish Cypriots. 
11. The number of the members of the Public Service Commission to be reduced from ten to 
either five or seven. 
12. All the decisions of the Public Service Commission to be taken by simple majority. If 
there is an allegation of discrimination on the unanimous request either of the Greek or of the 
Turkish members of the Commission, its Chairman to be bound to refer the matter to the 
Supreme Constitutional Court. 
13. The Greek Communal Chamber to be abolished. 
Sources:Chrysostomides, Kypros, ‘‘The Republic of Cyprus A Study in International Law’’, 
2000, (The Hague:Martinus Nijhoff Publishers), pp:33-34.  
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